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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper develops a theoretical model of land leasing that includes transaction 
costs of enforcing labor effort, risk pooling motives and non-tradable productive inputs.  
We test the implications of this model compared to those of the “Marshallian” 
(unenforceable labor effort) and “New School” (costlessly enforceable effort) 
perspectives using data collected from four villages in Ethiopia.  We find that land lease 
markets operate relatively efficiently in the villages studied, supporting the New School 
perspective relative to the other two models.  Land contract choice is found to depend 
upon the social relationships between landlords and tenants, but differences in contracts 
are not associated with significant differences in input use or output value per hectare.  
We find that other household and village characteristics do affect input use and output 
value, suggesting imperfections in other factor markets.  These results imply that 
interventions to improve the functioning of land lease markets are likely to be of little 
benefit for agricultural efficiency in the villages studied, whereas improvements in other 
factor markets may be more beneficial. 
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 LAND LEASE MARKETS AND AGRICULTURAL EFFICIENCY:  
THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM ETHIOPIA 
 
John Pender and Marcel Fafchamps 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The efficiency of land lease markets is a critical issue in many developing countries, 
where land sales markets are often thin and inhibited by problems of asymmetric information and 
limited development of credit markets.   The issue is particularly important in Ethiopia, where 
land sales are officially prohibited by the new Constitution and where land leases were 
prohibited by the former Marxist government until 1991.  Land leases have been permitted since 
the fall of the Derg regime and leasing is again common in many parts of Ethiopia, though 
restrictions have been imposed on lease arrangements in some regions of the country.  Now is 
thus an opportune time to assess the efficiency of the lease markets developing in Ethiopia, and 
implications for land tenure policies. 
There is an old and large literature on land tenure contracts and their implications for 
agricultural efficiency.
1  Adam Smith (1776), John Stuart Mill (1848), Alfred Marshall (1890), 
and numerous authors since have argued that share tenancy causes inefficient resource allocation 
because the share tenant receives as marginal revenue only a fraction of the value of his marginal 
product of labor, thus reducing the tenant’s incentive to supply labor or other inputs.  More 
recently, others have argued that if the tenant’s work effort can be monitored without cost and 
enforced by the landlord, then resource allocation can be as efficient under sharecropping as 
                                                 
1 For excellent reviews, see Otsuka, Chuma and Hayami (1992); Singh (1989); Otsuka amd Hayami (1988); and 




under owner-cultivation or fixed-rent tenancy (Johnson 1950; Cheung 1969).
2  Whether costs of 
monitoring and enforcement of contracts are sufficiently low to allow for efficient sharecropping 
is of course an empirical question. 
The available empirical evidence on the efficiency of alternative land tenure contracts is 
mixed.  The majority of studies do not find significant inefficiency of share tenancy (Otsuka and 
Hayami 1988).  However, many of these studies did not adequately distinguish sharecroppers 
from fixed-rent tenants or owner-operators and did not control for other factors that may affect 
input use and productivity, such as land quality or differences in farmers’ endowments or 
abilities (Shaban 1987).  Several studies that did control for such characteristics have found 
evidence supporting the Marshallian perspective (Bell 1977; Shaban 1987; Sadoulet et al. 1994; 
Laffont and Matoussi 1995; Chunrong et al. 1996). 
 The existing empirical literature on the effects of alternative land tenure contracts is 
dominated by studies conducted in south and southeast Asia, with very little information 
available from sub-Saharan Africa.
3  In this paper, we investigate the efficiency of land lease 
markets using data collected by the International Livestock Research Institute in four villages of 
Ethiopia.  In a recent paper, Gavian and Ehui (1999) found that total factor productivity was 
somewhat lower on informally contracted land (whether by cash rental, sharecropping, gift or 
borrowing) than on owner-cultivated land in these villages, while use of inputs was similar.  
However, Gavian and Ehui did not provide statistical tests of their results or control for other 
factors that may have caused measured differences in total factor productivity.  
                                                 
2 Marshall himself noted noted this possibility even while arguing for the inefficiency of sharecropping. 
3 There is a substantial and growing literature investigating the impacts of land rights and land titles on agricultural 




  In this paper, we develop a theoretical model of land use, land contract choice, and other 
input use that includes transaction costs, as well as allowing risk pooling motives and non-
tradable productive inputs such as draft animal services or human capital.  We test the 
implications of this model compared to those of the “Marshallian” (unenforceable labor effort) 
and “New School” (costlessly enforceable effort) perspectives using data collected from four 
villages in Ethiopia.  We do not find empirical support for the “Marshallian” prediction of 
inefficient sharecropping or for the implications of the transaction costs theory.   Our findings 
support the “New School” perspective of a well functioning lease market, suggesting that 
interventions in such markets would be of limited benefit for agricultural efficiency (though they 
may do harm).   Other household and village level factors are found to affect input use and 
output value, suggesting that improvements in other factor markets may be more beneficial. 
 
2. LAND MARKETS IN THE STUDY VILLAGES 
The study was conducted in the Arsi zone of the Oromia region of Ethiopia.  In this area, 
there was an active land market before the Marxist Derg regime nationalized land in 1975. Since 
the fall of the Derg in 1991, land leasing and informal transfers (but not sales) have again been 
allowed, subject to restrictions set by the regional governments.  Such transfers have again 
become common, while the regional government has avoided use of land redistribution. 
To investigate the impacts of alternative land tenure contracts on agricultural efficiency, 
the International Livestock Research Institute conducted a survey in four Peasant Associations 
(PAs or villages) in the Tiyo woreda (district) of Arsi zone in 1994.  A sample of 161 households 
was selected, stratified by whether the households “owned” (were allocated by the PA in a prior 




non-PA allocated (“landless”) households in the sample.  A household level survey collected 
information about household assets, management practices, etc., and a plot level survey collected 
information on crop inputs and outputs and tenure status of the plots operated by the sample 
households.
4   
Farmers are mainly semi-subsistence mixed crop-livestock producers in the study 
villages.  Wheat and barley are the dominant crops.  The villages are in a high potential cereal 
producing area with relatively assured rainfall, good soils and access to markets.   As a result, 
use of purchased inputs such as fertilizer and improved seeds is greater in the study villages than 
in many other parts of Ethiopia, or elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Farms are very small in the study villages, averaging less than 3 ha. operated (including 
cropland and pasture) per landowning household and less than 1 ha. operated per landless 
household. (Gavian and Teklu, 1996).  All landless households and many landowning 
households acquired (“imported”) cropland through various means from other households. Many 
households also owned and/or imported private pastureland, though we focus only on cropland 
transactions and their implications in this paper.  The survey did not collect reliable data on the 
amount of land “exported” by households, though we do know which households reported 
exporting land in the village census conducted prior to the survey. 
In the sample, cropland exporters owned the most cropland on average, followed by 
households who neither imported nor exported (“cropland non-traders”); while cropland 
importers owned the least amount of land (Table 1).  A few cropland exporters also imported 
land, though the average amount imported by cropland exporters is very small.  The total amount 
                                                 
4 If a household only operated PA-allocated plots, the plot survey was conducted only for one randomly selected 
plot.  In all other cases, the survey included all plots operated by the household.  More information on the study 




of cropland operated is very similar for importers and non-traders, indicating that land lease 
markets have helped to equalize land access.  Cropland importers tend to have a smaller labor 
endowment and own fewer oxen than non-traders (probably because they are younger 
households), but land imports still tend to reduce disparities between importers and non-traders 
in operated land-labor and land-oxen ratios.  Interestingly, cropland exporters have the largest 
labor endowments of the three categories, though their land-labor and land-oxen endowment 










Importers  Cropland Exporters 
All  
Households 
Number of sample households    60    78    23    161 
  ---- means (standard errors in parentheses)
1---- 
Cropland owned (ha)  1.59    (0.09)  0.78    (0.14)  1.80    (0.22)    1.32  (0.06) 
Cropland imported (ha)  0.00    (0.00)  0.86    (0.12)  0.18    (0.07)    0.36  (0.06) 
Cropland owned plus imported (ha)  1.59    (0.09)  1.64    (0.22)  1.98    (0.23)    1.68  (0.09) 
Household labor force (number of workers)  2.38    (0.20)  1.64    (0.12)  3.71    (0.49)    2.35  (0.14) 
Value of oxen owned (EB)  1289     (133)  1077     (142)  1247     (173)    1201  (83) 
Cropland owned per worker (ha/worker)   0.85    (0.06)  0.42    (0.09)  0.57    (0.10)    0.63  (0.04) 
Cropland owned plus imported per worker 
(ha/worker)  0.85    (0.06)  1.07    (0.15)  0.66    (0.11)    0.90  (0.06) 
Value of oxen owned per ha. of cropland 
owned
 (EB/ha)
  795      (85)  1185     (188)  974     (230)    925  (82) 
Value of oxen owned per ha of cropland 
owned plus imported (EB/ha) 
 
795      (85) 
 
647      (85) 
 
789     (203) 
 
 738  (62) 





The means of acquiring access to land are land gifts, fixed-rental, and sharecropping, and 
borrowing (in order from most to least common).  Gift fields are given free of any explicit charge 
for an indefinite period, while borrowed fields are also free but provided for a specified period.  
In terms of contract duration, gift and borrowed land are most like PA-allocated land, since the 
duration is generally longer for this type of land than for rented or sharecropped land.  Gift and 
borrowed land are usually provided by relatives, often parents providing land to newly married 
children.  Although there are not explicit charges, many tenants contribute labor to the 
landowner.  Because of their similarities, these two categories are combined in the analysis.   
Fixed rental involves a cash payment paid in advance to the landlord.  The tenant pays for 
all inputs, reaps all of the benefits and bears all of the risk from his production.  The landowner 
is usually not related to the tenant, the contract is almost always for only one year, and a written 
contract is used in most cases.  The average rental cost was 352 EB (US $56) per ha. for the 
rented sample fields in 1993/94 (Ibid.).   
Sharecropping agreements provide a share of the harvest to the landowner, usually one-
half or one-third.  The landowner is usually not a relative of the share tenant.  The contract is 
usually for only one year, but is three or more years in about one-third of cases.  In contracts in 
which the landowner receives a one-half share, the landowner often provides a share of the 
inputs in production and harvesting, including purchased inputs and harvesting labor, though the 
terms vary significantly across contracts.  It is rare for the landowner to provide oxen or pre-
harvest labor, however.  Direct credit linkages between landlords and tenants are also relatively 
rare, with the tenant borrowing from the landlord in only two cases and the landlord borrowing 
from the tenant in three cases.  After deducting the landowner’s share of inputs from his share of 




high cost, relative to the cost of cash rental, suggests that tenants choose sharecropping because 
of its risk pooling advantages or because they are unable to rent due to lack of cash or credit.  
Consistent with this, the most common reasons reported for sharecropping were to share risk and 
lack of cash.   
Households farming owner-operated fields tend to own more cropland, have more labor, 
and tend to be older and less educated than the households operating imported fields (Table 2).  
Recipients of gift/borrowed plots tend to have fewer workers in the household and to be poorer 
in general (less land owned, less livestock), younger, more educated, of longer residence in the 
village, and more likely to be related to the landowner than operators of land acquired under 
other tenure arrangements.  There are few clear differences between characteristics of tenants 
who have acquired land under fixed rental and those using sharecropping, except that 
sharecropping is not used by recent immigrants to the villages and is less common among ethnic 
Oromo people.  This suggests that the choice of sharecropping vs. fixed rental depends on social 




Table 2 – Characteristics of Households and Cultivated Plots under Different Tenure Arrangements 
  Type of Tenure 
Item  PA-allocated  Fixed rent  Sharecrop  Gift/borrowed  All fields 
Number of sample fields    149  64  31  56  300 
  - means (standard errors in parentheses)
1  
Characteristics of operator households       
  -  Cropland owned (ha)    1.93  (0.12)    1.00  (0.25)    1.20  (0.31)         0.16         (0.09)     1.46       (0.14) 
  -   Household labor force    2.69  (0.18)    1.95  (0.22)    2.05  (0.28)         1.28         (0.10)     2.31       (0.15) 
  -   Value of oxen owned (EB)    1666  (134)    1670  (232)    1688  (313)          676          (137)    1537        (139) 
 -    Value of other livestock owned (EB)    1874  (202)    1669  (274)    1538  (336)          687          (130)    1646        (181) 
  -   Age of household head (years)    41.1  (1.9)    30.0  (1.6)    31.0  (2.3)         24.3           (1.1)     35.9         (1.5) 
    -   Education of household head         
  --   % illiterate    38.4  (6.4)    14.1  (5.6)    15.3  (6.9)           4.1          (2.7)     27.3         (5.0) 
  --   % can read and write    20.3  (5.1)    7.1  (3.9)    7.6  (4.7)           0.0          (0.0)     14.1         (4.0) 
  --    % completed primary school    17.9  (5.9)    26.3  (7.9)    32.3  (12.5)         39.7          (8.9)      23. 7        (5.3) 
  --    % completed secondary school    23.4  (5.9)    52.6  (9.5)    44.9  (12.5)         56.2          (9.0)      34.9        (6.0) 
    -   Length of family residence in village         
  --   % whose father was born in village    42.6  (6.5)    56.1  (9.8)    52.2  (12.6)         67.3          (8.4)      49.2        (6.1) 
  --   % whose father immigrated but were born in village    47.4  (6.9)    39.5    (9.9)    47.8  (12.6)         29.5          (8.2)      43.7        (6.3) 
  --    % who immigrated to village    10.0  (3.7)    4.4    (3.7)    0.0  (0.0)           3.2          (2.8)        7.1        (2.8) 
    -    Ethnicity - % Oromo    74.1  (5.8)    75.6    (8.6)    63.3  (12.8)         71.5          (7.7)      72.9        (5.4) 
   -   Relationship to landowner - % with landowner a relative    N/A    31.0    (6.0)    31.5  (11.1)         89.3          (5.5)      45.2        (5.4) 
    -    Number of years household has farmed the plot          8.31           (0.93)         0.59           (0.12)        1.80           (0.49)         1.62         (0.28)      5.45       (0.60) 
Characteristics of Fields         
  -  % having red soil    4.6  (1.3)    11.4    (4.2)    11.1  (4.7)          12.1         (4.1)        7.4        (1.3) 
  -   % flat or gently sloped (not stony)    77.3  (4.0)    78.6  (5.7)    82.7  (7.2)          86.3         (4.4)      79.3        (2.7) 
  -   % with no reported erosion  problems    78.2  (3.9)    82.6  (5.0)    70.7  (8.9)          71.8         (7.4)      77.3        (3.2) 
  -   % irrigated    23.1  (3.7)    14.9  (5.0)    15.3  (7.2)          19.8         (6.0)      20.5        (3.0) 
  -   Distance from field to compound (meters)    1281  (100)    1816  (179)    1469  (311)         1338        (225)     1398         (89) 
Input use and outputs – 1993/94         
  -  total labor hours per ha     190  (12)    188  (21)    139  (14)  192           (22)       184           (9) 
  -   total oxen hours per ha    376  (16)    402  (38)    309  (28)  359           (29)       371         (14) 
  -   total value of output per ha (EB)    2872  (111)    2623  (181)    2534  (293)  2233          (183)     2710         (85) 
1Means and standard errors were corrected for stratification, sampling weights, and clustering (non-independence of observations within households.)  Difference in means among tenure 




  There are also some differences in the characteristics of the plots operated under 
different tenure arrangements.  Owner-operated plots are less likely to have red soils and more 
likely to be irrigated than imported plots.  Rented plots are least likely to have reported erosion 
problems, but are further from the operator household’s residence than other tenure categories.  
Sharecropped plots also tend to be somewhat further from the residence than owner-operated or 
gift/borrowed plots.  Overall, however, it is not clear that the average quality of land is superior 
or inferior in any tenure category. 
Total labor and oxen use per hectare are lower on sharecropped fields than on other 
fields.  The value of output per hectare is highest on owner-operated fields and lowest on 
gift/borrowed fields.  These differences in input use and output per hectare may be due to other 
factors than tenure status however, such as the differences in tenant household characteristics or 
plot quality characteristics mentioned above.  Below we investigate whether such differences are 
robust after controlling for differences in village and household characteristics and plot quality. 
 
3.  THEORY OF LAND TENANCY CONTRACTS 
Restrictions on land sales, as in Ethiopia, need not be a source of inefficiency, and 
achieving efficiency may not even require land lease markets to function.  If there are perfect 
markets for other factors of production, those factors can be hired in or out by landowners until 
all factors of production earn equal marginal products by all landowners, resulting in productive 
efficiency (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1984).  Tenancy is thus not necessary unless there is 
some other market imperfection besides an imperfect land market.   
In the presence of production risk and missing insurance markets, households can use 




intensity of labor effort can be costlessly monitored and enforced (Johnson, 1950; Cheung, 
1969).  Cheung thus takes risk pooling as an argument for the existence of sharecropping.  
Newbery (1975) has shown, however, that if the production technology is constant returns to 
scale and labor can be costlessly monitored then the same degree of risk pooling and productive 
efficiency can be achieved by a combination of fixed rental and wage contract.  Thus some 
additional market imperfection is necessary to explain the choice of sharecropping.   
One of the most commonly cited arguments for sharecropping to exist is the difficulty of 
monitoring labor effort.  If labor effort is unobservable, sharecropping will dominate wage labor 
because of its incentive advantages and dominate fixed rental because of its risk pooling 
advantages (Stiglitz 1974).   Although this argument is persuasive, it is not clear how it could 
lead to multiple contract forms coexisting in the same communities, unless, as seems unlikely in 
the context of smallholders in Ethiopia, some tenants are risk neutral while others are risk averse 
(Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1984).
5   
Cash constraints could lead to multiple contract forms.  Tenants who are cash constrained 
might be unable to pay a cash rent and thus be forced to use share tenancy.  For similar reasons, 
cash constrained landlords may prefer to use cash rental.  Whether such differences in contracts 
have any implications for agricultural efficiency, however, depends upon whether there are 
transaction costs of monitoring and enforcing contracts.  If labor can be costlessly monitored, 
then any outcome achievable via a cash rental contract can also be achieved via a share rental 
contract, as in Cheung’s model.  Thus, transaction costs are essential to explain why productive 
inefficiency may result as a result of differences in lease contracts. 
                                                 
5 In his seminal treatment of the topic, Stiglitz (1974) proved that fixed rental would only occur if the tenant is risk 
neutral.  However, he assumed that landlords are risk neutral in his model with unenforceable labor effort.  We are 
not aware of any paper that has proved whether fixed rental is possible with risk averse tenants and landlords and 




In this paper, we consider a model in which tenants’ effort is observable but costly to 
monitor and enforce.  In this case, coexistence of fixed rental and sharecropping contracts may 
occur as a result of differences in transaction costs.  Below, we derive the empirical implications 
of this model and contrast those to the implications of the “New School” model with costless 
enforcement and the “Marshallian” model with unenforceable effort.  We also consider the 
empirical implications of slight variations of the model, such as allowing for cash constraints. 
 
Model 
  Suppose that production is determined by three factors of production: land (H), labor (L) 
and capital services (K).   Production by household i on plot p (Y
ip) is assumed to be a constant 
returns to scale function of the amount of each factor applied to the plot: 
1)  ) , , (
p p p ip ip K L H F Y θ =  
The production function may vary across households and plots, though we will suppress the 
household superscript to simplify notation.  θ is a random variable with an expected value of 1 
and positive variance, and which is unknown to households at the time decisions about H and L 
are made.   We assume that θ is the same for all households in a village, such as may result from 
weather or price related risks, though the model could be readily extended to incorporate 
idiosyncratic risks. 
   Households are endowed with land (H
i), labor (L
i) and capital (K
i).  We assume that a 
local labor market and a lease market for land exist, but that there is no market for capital.
 
Below, we consider the implications of relaxing the assumption that capital is not marketed. If a 





of monitoring the worker’s effort.  We assume that the transaction cost is a non-decreasing 




If a plot of land (s) is leased out, the landlord charges a lease payment, which is a linear 
combination of a share of output (1-α) and a fixed rent (β): 
2) 
s s s s s H K L H F payment Lease β θ α + − = ) , , ( ) 1 (  
 
If 0<α<1 and β=0, then the contract is a pure share contract.  If α=1 and β>0, then the contract is 
a fixed rent contract.  We assume that β is unrestricted; i.e., a mixture of share and rental in a 
contract is possible.    
The landlord can monitor and enforce the tenant’s use of inputs on the plot, and hence is 
able to select the level of inputs, but pays a transaction cost for this (ch).  We assume that this 
cost is a non-decreasing function of the size of the plot, and the amount of labor and capital 
applied by the tenant (chH≥0, chL≥0, chK≥0).  We also assume that the monitoring costs are a 
non-increasing function of the share of output received by the tenant, since the tenant has greater 
incentive to apply effort if he receives a higher share (chα≤0).
7   
For simplicity, we assume that each landlord household operates only one owned plot and 
leases out one plot, and that each tenant operates his own plot plus one leased in plot.  Thus, each 
landlord deals with only one tenant, and vice versa.  This assumption does not affect the 
predictions of the model to be tested. 





i is a strictly concave function.  We assume that tenants select their level of leisure (M
t) 
                                                 
6 We use subscripts to denote partial derivatives. 
7 If no monitoring is necessary for a fixed rent contract, then we would have ch=0 when α=1.  However, the landlord 
may need to monitor the use of the land even in a fixed rental contract, to assure that the tenant does not misuse the 




and labor use on their own plot (L




s).  As in Cheung’s model, landlords are able to specify the level of inputs on leased 
plots, though there are transaction costs associated with monitoring and enforcing these.    
The tenant’s maximization problem is thus: 
3)   
} ), ( ) ( ) ( *
) , , ( ) , , ( {
,
t t t t s t t t t s t s
s s s s s t t t t t
t M t L
M z g L M L L cl L M L L w H
K L H F K K L H F Eu Max







t) is the tenant’s income from other assets (z
t) and the other variables are as defined 
above.   
The first order conditions for this problem are (assuming an interior solution): 
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Before we consider the landlord’s problem, it is useful to point out that if the landlord can 
not enforce the tenant’s labor or capital use on the leased in plot, the tenant will also choose L
s 
and K
s to maximize 3), resulting in two additional first order conditions: 




L F F α =  




K F F α =  
 
Equations 6) and 7) illustrate the “Marshallian” result that if the tenant’s inputs are 
unenforceable, productive inefficiency results.  If the same production function applies to the 
tenant’s own plot and leased in plot (F
t( )=F




constant), then equations 6) and 7) imply that labor and capital use per hectare and yield will be 
lower on sharecropped than tenant’s own plot if α<1 (Shaban 1987).
8   
Enforceable Contracts 
Returning to the case of enforceable contracts, the landlord’s problem is given by: 
8)   
} ), ( ) , , , ( ) ( ) ( *
) , , ( ) 1 ( ) , , ( {
, , , , , ,
l l s s s l l l l l l l s
s s s s l l s l l l
K L H M L
M z g K L H ch L M L cl L M L w H
K L H F K L H H F Eu Max s s s l l




β α  
 
subject to the tenant’s participation constraint 
9)   
t t t t t s t t t t s t s
s s s s s t t t t t
U M z g L M L L cl L M L L w H
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and the first order conditions of the tenant’s problem ((4) and (5)).   
  The first order conditions for this problem (assuming an interior solution) lead to the 
following conditions, in addition to equations 4), 5) and 9):
9 
                                                 
8 The assumption that L and K are normal for fixed H holds for the CES class of production functions (Shaban 
1987). 
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s, α and β based on the 








l, w) and the functions u
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Fixed Transaction Costs 
If all transaction costs are fixed costs, these equations imply  
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If the production functions for the tenant’s own and sharecropped plots are the same (F
t( ) 
= F


















K..  Thus, even though there is no capital market, equalization of all marginal 
rates of substitution and marginal products between each landlord and tenant occurs through the 
operation of the labor and land lease markets if transaction costs are constant.  This does not 
guarantee unconstrained pareto optimality in the economy, since with positive fixed transaction 
costs there may be households that do not participate in these factor markets, or differences 
across landlord-tenant pairs in the marginal products and rates of substitution.  Of course, if 
transaction costs are zero, the model reduces to Cheung’s model, and pareto optimality is 
achieved. 
In the efficient markets case with zero transaction costs, the total amount of land operated 
by any household will not depend upon its own endowment of land or labor, though it will 
depend upon the household’s endowment of capital, due to the non-marketability of capital.  
Thus a simple test of the efficient land and labor markets hypothesis is whether the land area 
operated by households is affected by their endowments of land or labor.  Under efficient land 
markets, these endowments should have no effect on area operated, or on factor intensities or 
yields.   
If there are no transaction costs, the choice of contract is indeterminate, as shown by 
Newbery.  However, if there are cash constraints, this may determine the contract choice even in 
the absence of transaction costs.  For example, suppose that the tenant is required to pay the land 
rent prior to earning labor income, that other income (g(z
t)) can be used to pay rent, and that he is 
                                                 
10 This can be shown by writing the production function as F(H,K,L)=Hf(k,l), where k=K/H, l=L/H, and f( ) is a 
strictly concave function.  Since FK=fk(k,l) and FL=fl,(k,l) and f( ) is strictly concave, we can invert this system to 
determine k=g(FK,FL) and l=h(FK,FL).  Since FK
s=FK
t  and FL
s=FL















unable to borrow to pay land rent.  Then the maximum rent he can pay is g(z
t).  Clearly, the 
smaller is g(z
t), the more likely the tenant is to be limited to a sharecropping contract.  A test of 
the presence of cash constraints is thus whether factors determining non-crop income (such as 
ownership of livestock other than oxen) increase the likelihood of sharecropping relative to fixed 
rental.  If transaction costs are zero but there are cash constraints, such factors could affect 
contract choice but not factor intensities or yields.  If transaction costs are positive, on the other 
hand, such factors may affect contract choice even in the absence of cash constraints (since non-
crop income affects equation 9).    
A test of the assumption of non-marketable capital is whether the household’s 
endowment of capital has any effect on area operated.  If capital is marketable with no 
transactions costs, this endowment should also not affect area operated.  If capital is not 
marketable (but labor and land are marketable without transaction costs), then households with 
greater capital endowments will operate more land if capital and land are complements (FKH>0), 
and less land if capital and labor are substitutes (FKH<0).  The capital endowment will not affect 
factor ratios or yields in this case, however.  If capital is marketable but subject to transaction 
costs, the effect of capital endowment would be analogous to the effect of labor endowment 
when labor is marketable but subject to transaction costs.   
Variable Transaction Costs 
In the case with variable transaction costs, the unconstrained pareto optimum is no longer 
achieved, since there will be differences in marginal rates of substitution and marginal products 
of factors across households.  For example, if chα < 0, equation 12) implies that the marginal rate 
of substitution between risky income and riskless income (EuQθ/EuQ) will be greater for the 
landlord than the tenant, and suggests that the tenant will bear more risk (and the landlord less 

































Q is an 




Q is a decreasing function of α.
11 The landlord seeks to 
increase α above the level at which perfect risk pooling occurs, sacrificing optimal risk pooling 
in order to reduce transaction costs.  This suggests that a pure rental contract will be more likely 
in situations where the transaction costs of monitoring land leases are larger and more responsive 
to changes in α.
12 We expect this to be more likely if the tenant and landlord are unrelated than if 
they are relatives or long associates.  Thus, we expect sharecropping to be more common among 
relatives or long associates, and rental contracts to be more common among unrelated 
individuals. 
Many of the differences in marginal products are ambiguous and depend on the relative 
magnitudes of the marginal transaction cost terms.  For example, if chα=0 or α=1 and chL>0, 




L.  In this case the tenant will put relatively less effort 
into the leased plot than his own plot because of the landlord’s transaction costs of monitoring 





L.   In this case the tenant is encouraged to put more effort into the sharecropped plot 
because of the risk sharing of the output from that plot.  The results for capital are similar:  if 










If capital services were tradable, subject to transaction costs, the model’s qualitative 
predictions about capital would be the same as those for labor, since capital would enter the 
model in exactly the same way as labor.  Since we have just shown that the qualitative 
                                                 
11 The proof is given in the Appendix.  The assumption of constant or increasing absolute risk aversion is a 
sufficient but not necessary condition.  These results may also hold with decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
12 We say “suggests” since we do not offer a formal proof of this hypothesis.  The proof is difficult due to the large 
number of endogenous variables in the system of equations 4), 5), and 9)-15).  However, the intuition that the 




predictions of the model are the same for capital and labor even when capital is not marketable, 
we cannot test the assumption of non-marketable capital relative to the assumption of marketable 
capital with transactions costs.  However, we can test these models relative to the no-transaction 
costs model as noted earlier.   






13  A positive marginal cost of monitoring land use by the tenant will cause the 
landlord to restrict land availability to the tenant, even when the tenant has a higher marginal 
product of land.  This effect is even stronger when the transaction cost depends on the tenant’s 
share, since the tenant is forced to bear more risk, which tends to reduce the optimal level of land 
use in this case.   
The difference between the tenant’s and landlord’s marginal products of land implied by 
equation 15) also has implications for differences in yields and factor intensities.  If the 
production function is of the CES class, then yield is a positive function of the marginal product 
of land.
14  Thus, if chH>0 or chα<0, the tenant’s yield on the leased in plot must be higher than 





l, or both.  This prediction stands in sharp contrast to the Marshallian 
prediction that factor intensities and yields are higher on owner-operated than sharecropped plots 
(Shaban 1987).   
Note, however, that our prediction compares tenants’ to landlords’ factor intensities and 
yields.  The difference between tenants’ and landlords’ factor intensities and yields for the 
unenforceable contracts case depends on the elasticity of substitution between land and labor, 
with no difference arising if the elasticity of substitution is unity (Otsuka and Hayami 1988).  By 
                                                 
13 Recall that we have assumed that chH≥0 and chα≤0; the result holds even if only one of these in non-zero. 









contrast, our model predicts differences between landlords’ and tenants’ factor intensity and 
yields even if the elasticity of substitution is unity. 
If the marginal transaction costs of monitoring fixed rent contracts are zero, then our 
model predicts that factor intensities and yields will be the same on the tenant’s plots under fixed 
rent as on the tenant’s or landlord’s own plots.  This could be the case if the transaction costs 
were needed only to ensure that the tenant applies sufficient variable inputs to the plot.  
However, as mentioned previously, the owner may also need to monitor the tenant’s use of the 
plot to ensure that the tenant is not depleting soil fertility or otherwise damaging the plot 
(Murrell 1983; Datta et al. 1986).  In this case, there would be differences in factor intensities 
and yields between owner-operated plots and plots leased in under fixed rental.   
Summary of Model Predictions 
The predictions of the transaction costs model are summarized in Table 3, along with the 
predictions of the costless enforcement of contracts (“New School”) model and the 




Table 3 – Predictions of Alternative Land Tenancy Theories 
Variable Affected  Determinant Factors  Costless Enforcement of 
Contracts (“New School”)  
Unenforceable Contracts 
(“Marshallian”) 
Enforceable Contracts with 
Transaction Costs 
Area operated by 
tenant 
Tenant’s factor  
endowments 
- No effect of land or labor 
endowments 
- No effect of capital endowment 
if capital marketable  
-If capital not marketable, 
positive effect if FHK > 0, 
negative effect if FHK < 0 
 




  - No prediction (combination of 
wage and fixed rental equivalent 
to sharecropping) unless a cash 
constraint binding 
- Sharecropping always chosen if 
both landlord and tenant risk 
averse 
- Relationship between tenant and 
landlord favors sharecropping 
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  The New School model predicts that land and labor endowments have no impact on area 
operated and predicts equalization of factor intensities and yields, but makes no prediction about 
contract choice (unless there are cash constraints).  The Marshallian model predicts that 
sharecropping is always preferred to fixed rental if both landlords and tenants are risk averse, 
that tenants will apply less inputs and achieve lower yields on sharecropped plots than their own 
plots or plots leased under fixed rental, and that sharecroppers’ input intensity and yields relative 
to landlords’ will depend on the elasticity of substitution between land and inputs.  Our model of 
enforceable contracts with transactions costs predicts that all factor endowments may influence 
area operated, contract choice, factor intensity and yields; that a relationship between landlords 
and tenants favors the choice of sharecropping; and that yields and at least some factor intensities 
are higher on sharecropped land than on the landlord’s owner-operated land.  The model also 
predicts different factor intensities and yields on tenant’s own land vs. leased land in general, 
though which is larger depends on the relative magnitudes of various marginal transaction costs. 
 
4.  ECONOMETRIC APPROACH AND RESULTS 
The theory presented in section 3 predicts that land use, lease contract choice, use of 
labor, oxen and output may depend on many factors.  If transaction costs are negligible, most of 
these factors are irrelevant and only endowments of non-marketed assets and prices should 
matter.  Of course, we would not expect to observe sole owner-operators if transaction costs are 
negligible, so we have a priori reason to believe that transaction costs are important in land 




We have data on three types of dependent variables:  1) cropland area operated; 2) choice 
of land tenure contract when land is imported; and 3) labor use, oxen use, and value of output per 
unit of land.  The econometric model is different for each of these types of dependent variables.   
 
CROPLAND AREA OPERATED 
Econometric Model 
We do not observe actual cropland area operated, but rather the area “owned” (allocated 
by the Peasant Association) plus the area “imported” (acquired by fixed rental, sharecropping, 
gift or borrowing).  We do not have reliable information on the amount of cropland “exported”.   
Cropland area operated is thus observed for cropland importers (who do not export), but left-
censored for other households.  We therefore use a censored regression model for area operated. 
Define hop as ln(area operated by a cropland importer), h as ln(H+Himported) and h as 
ln(H).  We assume that  
21)  h h h op u x h + = β  
for cropland importers, where xh is a vector of observed variables affecting desired area operated, 
and uh is an unobserved error term.  Note that hop is observed only for households that import but 
do not export cropland.  For these households, we have that  
22)  h h h op u x h h + = = β  
For all other households, we have that
15: 
 23)  h h h u x h + ≥β  
                                                 
15 If a household does not import land (either autarkic or an exporter), then desired operated area (if it were to 
import) must be less than or equal to its endowment (h) plus some positive amount (∆h) necessary for an importer to 
overcome fixed transaction costs.  Ideally, ∆h should be included on the left side of relation 23) and estimated.  
However, this parameter is not identified, and excluding it biases only the intercept of βh (assuming that ∆h is 
constant or randomly distributed and uncorrelated with xh).  If a household is both an exporter and importer, relation 




We estimate this model two ways: 1) maximum likelihood estimation, assuming that uh is 
independently and identically normally distributed across households, and 2) censored least 
absolute deviation (CLAD) estimation using the method of Buchinsky (1994), which avoids any 
distributional assumption concerning uh. 
According to the theory presented earlier, area operated may be affected by the 
household’s endowments of land, labor, capital, other assets determining household income, 
factors associated with the household’s reservation utility or preferences, factors affecting the 
household’s agricultural productivity, factors affecting transaction costs, relative prices and 
wages, and the endowments, preferences and production functions of potential land tenancy 
partners.  The household’s physical endowments are represented in the regression specification 
by the logarithms of land owned, household labor supply, value of oxen owned, and value of 
other livestock owned.
16  We also include dummy variables for households with no land, oxen, 
or other livestock, since these cases otherwise cause difficulties for the log-log specification 
used.
17  Human capital endowments (potentially affecting both farm productivity and non-farm 
sources of income) are represented by the logarithm of age of the household head and the level 
of education of the household head.  Transaction costs may be affected by many of these factors, 
as well as by social status and networks of the household.  We represent these by indicators of 
the length of time the farm household has been settled in the village and the ethnicity of the 
household.  Relative prices and the characteristics of potential tenancy partners are represented 
by village level dummy variables, which also may reflect differences across villages in 
                                                 
16 We used a logarithmic specification for these variables and the dependent variable to reduce problems of non-
normality and sensitivity to outliers.  Similar qualitative results were obtained using a linear specification 
(regression results available from the authors upon request). 




agroclimatic factors affecting farm productivity, access to markets or off-farm sources of 
income. 
Results 
The censored regression results are presented in Table 4.  The maximum likelihood 
estimates support the transaction costs model, since area operated is found to be positively (and 
statistically significantly) associated with land ownership.  The positive effect of oxen ownership 
also supports the transaction costs model, implying imperfections in oxen rental markets and that 




Table 4 – Determinants of ln(Cropland Area Operated) – Censored Regressions 
Explanatory variable  Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation 
Censored Least Absolute 
Deviations Estimation 
Village (cf. Abichiu Peasant Association) 
-  Bilalo Peasant Association 
-  Ketar Genet Peasant Association  









ln(Crop land owned) (ha)  0.353**  -0.004 
Landless (dummy variable=1 when cropland owned=0)  -0.363**  -0.031 
ln (Household labor supply) (number of workers)  0.048  0.348 
ln(Value of oxen owned) (EB)  0.338***  0.400 
No oxen (dummy variable=1 when oxen owned=0)  1.842**  2.167 
ln(Value of other livestock owned) (EB)  0.051  0.075 
No other livestock (dummy variable=1 when other livestock owned=0)  0.158  0.273 
ln(age of household head) (years)  -0.338  -0.035 
Education of household head (cf. illiterate) 
-  Read and write 
-  Finished primary school 









Length of time in village (cf. father born in village) 
-  Father immigrated to village, farmer born in village 







Ethnicity of household Oromo  -0.016  -0.356 
Intercept -1.450  -2.653 
Number of uncensored/total observations  78/161  77/161
b 
Pseudo R
2   0.479 
a.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  Coefficients and standard errors of maximum likelihood estimator were 
corrected for sample weights and stratification.   





In the CLAD estimation, only village effects are statistically significant.  The effect of 
oxen ownership is in the same direction and similar in magnitude as in the maximum likelihood 
(ML) model, but is no longer statistically significant due to the larger standard errors in the 
CLAD model.  By contrast, the effect of land ownership is much smaller in magnitude and of the 
opposite sign in the CLAD model to that expected (for the coefficient of ln(area operated)).  We 
obtained similar qualitative results using linear versions of the ML and CLAD models, with the 
linear ML model supporting the hypothesis that area operated depends on area owned, but this 
not being supported by the linear CLAD model.
18  Interestingly, however, higher oxen ownership 
significantly increases area operated in the linear versions of both models.  
  The results of the CLAD model reduce our confidence in the implication of the ML 
model that imperfections in the land lease market exist, and suggest that those results hinge upon 
distributional assumptions of the ML model.  On the other hand, the insignificant effect of oxen 
ownership in the logarithmic version CLAD model may simply be a result of the lower statistical 
power of that model (given the similar magnitude of the coefficients in both models).  Next we 
examine the other evidence available concerning the efficiency of land markets in the study 




For imported fields, we model the choice of tenure arrangement using a multinomial logit 
model.  We include the same explanatory variables as in the regression for land imports.  Since 
the data are for specific tenancy contracts (in contrast to the cropland area regression), we can 
                                                 




include explanatory variables specific to the particular landlord as well.  One factor that may be 
an additional important indicator of the transaction costs of the contract is the relationship 
between the landowner and tenant.  If the landowner is a relative of the tenant or if the tenant and 
the landlord have established a long-term relationship, the transaction costs may be lower, thus 
tending to favor sharecropping or gift/borrowing over a fixed rental arrangement.  Thus we 
include variables indicating whether the landlord is a relative of the tenant and the number of 
years the farmer has farmed the plot.   
Results 
As expected, the length of time the tenant has farmed the plot is positively associated 
with both sharecropping and gift or borrowing arrangements (Table 5).  Recent immigrants to the 
village are very unlikely to acquire plots by sharecropping, while gift and borrowed plots are 
much more common when the landowner is a relative of the tenant.  These findings confirm our 
expectations about the importance of social relationships in determining transaction costs and 




Table 5 – Determinants of Lease Contract Choice - Multinomial Logit Model 
Explanatory Variables
a  Sharecropping Contract  Gift/Borrowed 
Village (cf. Abichiu Peasant Association) 
-  Bilalo Peasant Association 
-  Ketar Genet Peasant Association  









ln(Crop land owned) (ha)  0.237  -1.165 
Landless (dummy variable=1 when cropland owned=0)  -0.884 -0.456 
ln(Household labor supply) (number of workers)  -0.171  -1.760*** 
ln(Value of oxen owned) (EB)  -0.520  -0.657 
No oxen (dummy variable=1 when oxen owned=0)  -4.000 -2.957 
ln(Value of other livestock owned) (EB)  -0.329 -0.322 
No other livestock (dummy variable=1 when other livestock 
owned=0) 
-43.866*** -1.391 
ln(Age of household head) (years)  0.372  1.577 
Education of household head (cf. illiterate) 
-  Read and write 
-  Finished primary school 









Length of time in village (cf. father born in village) 
-  Father immigrated to village, farmer born in village 







Ethnicity of household Oromo  -0.738  -0.332 
Landlord is a relative of tenant  0.038  3.440*** 
Number of years farmer has farmed the plot  1.576***  1.939*** 
Mean predicted probabilities|actual contract
b 











a.  *, **, ***  indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  Omitted category is cash rental.  Coefficients and standard errors 
were corrected for sample weights, stratification and clustering.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.  Intercepts are not reported.  Number of 
observations is 151. 





Other factors affecting contract choice include lack of ownership of livestock other than 
oxen (negative association of dummy variable with sharecropping), household labor supply 
(negative association with land gifts/borrowing), and literacy (literate households less likely to 
receive land through gifts/borrowing).  The negative associations of household labor supply and 
literacy with land gifts/borrowing suggests that gifts and loans of land may be reserved for 
poorer relatives who have fewer alternative income earning opportunities.  Households with 
greater human capital endowments may be better able to afford to rent or sharecrop land, which 
may be of higher quality (more on this below).  We do not have a strong hypothesis to explain 
the negative association between lack of other livestock and sharecropping.  Given that 
sharecropping can be a way for tenants who lack access to liquidity to lease land, we expected if 
anything a positive relationship between lack of livestock and sharecropping (relative to fixed 
rental). This finding does not support the hypothesis of cash constraints determining land 
contract choice.
19 
INPUT USE AND OUTPUT VALUE PER HECTARE  
Econometric Model 
The econometric model estimated for these dependent variables can be summarized as 
follows: 
24) 
hp p p h h gp ih ig sp ih is rp ih ir gp g sp s rp r xh x ih i hp v x b x b D D b D D b D D b D b D b D b D b D b a y + + + + + + + + + + + =
 
 
where yhp is ln(labor use per ha.), ln(oxen use per ha.), or ln(value of output per ha.) for 
household h and plot p; Dih and Dxh are dummy variables equal to 1 if household h is a land 
                                                 





importer or exporter, respectively; Drp, Dsp and Dgp are dummy variables equal to 1 if plot p is 
rented, sharecropped or gift/borrowed, respectively;  xh and xp are vectors of household and plot 
characteristics affecting the dependent variables; vhp are unobserved factors affecting the 
dependent variables, and a, bi, bx, br,  bs, bg, bir, bis, big,  bh, bp are coefficient vectors to be 
estimated. 
We include interactions between households’ land trade status and the tenure status of the 
plot to be able to test the specific hypotheses following from the theory presented in section 3.  
For example, to test the implication of the transaction costs model that yields will be higher on 
sharecroppers’ leased-in plots than landlords’ owner-operated plots, we cannot determine this 
from the average effect of either the land trade status of the household or the tenancy status of 
the plot.  We need interaction terms for this. 
The following hypotheses are tested: 
Hypothesis Test 
1)  y(rented|importer) - y(owned|importer) = 0  br + bir = 0 
2)  y(shared|importer) - y(owned|importer) = 0  bs + bis = 0 
3)  y(gift/borrowed|importer) - y(owned|importer) = 0  bg + big = 0 
4)  y(rented|importer) – y(owned|exporter) = 0  br + bir + bi – bx = 0 
5)  y(shared|importer) – y(owned|exporter) = 0  bs + bis + bi – bx = 0 
6)  y(gift/borrowed|importer) – y(owned|exporter) = 0  bg + big + bi – bx = 0 
 
Tests 1) – 3) compare inputs and outputs on a tenant’s imported plots and his own plots.  
These tests are comparable to the tests for Marshallian inefficiency in studies such as Bell (1977) 




6) test the predictions of the theory presented in Section 3 that inputs and outputs should be 
greater on tenants’ imported plots than on landlords’ own plots, as a result of transaction costs. 
We estimated two versions of the model.  In one, xh includes the same explanatory 
variables used to predict area operated.   Such household level factors are not expected to affect 
factor use and output per hectare unless there are factor market imperfections (Udry 1996).  In 
the second version, we included household level fixed effects to account for all possible 
household level factors (measured or unmeasured) affecting the dependent variables.  The fixed 
effects model was estimated for the subsample of households who were cropland importers and 
also operated PA-allocated land.  This is similar to the approach devised by Shaban to test for 
Marshallian inefficiency.  In the fixed effects regressions, we could not include household level 
factors (xh, Dih, Dxh).  Thus, we could not test hypotheses 4)-6) using the fixed effects 
regressions. 
The measured plot level characteristics assumed to affect input use and output include the 
type of soil (red soil expected to be less productive than black soil), the slope of the field (flat or 
gently sloping fields expected to receive more inputs and produce greater output than steeply 
sloping fields), whether there had been erosion problems on the field (ambiguous impact on 
inputs but expected to reduce productivity), the use of irrigation on the field (expected to 
increase input use and value of output), and the distance of the field from the household 
compound (expected to reduce input use and output). 
The endogeneity of the contract choice for imported fields could lead to biased estimates 




variables, taking as instruments for contract choice the predicted probabilities of each import 
contract from a multinomial logit regression.
20   
In all of the above regressions, coefficients and standard errors are adjusted to account for 
sample stratification and sample weights.  The estimated standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and to possible non-independence of multiple observations from the same 
household.   
To better understand the mechanisms by which land tenure contracts and other factors 
affect crop output, and to test for impacts of land contracts on total factor productivity, we also 
estimate a structural model of output value using three-stage least squares.  We assume that the 
production function is a Cobb-Douglas form, with ln(output/ha) as a linear function of ln(labor 
use/ha), ln(oxen use/ha), ln(age of household head), and a set of dummy variables representing 
land tenure categories, village level effects, education levels, and plot quality characteristics.
21  
In the three-stage least squares model, ln(labor use/ha) and ln(oxen use/ha) were estimated using 
the same fixed effects specification discussed earlier. 
Results 
In the regressions without household fixed effects, we find statistically significant effects 
of the plot tenure variables and the interaction terms between land trade status of the household 
and plot tenure (Table 6).
                                                 
20 To increase the efficiency of the instrumental variables estimator, we included household level fixed effects in the 
multinomial logit model used to predict the instruments for contract choice.  Regression results are available from 
the authors upon request. 
21 Use of the Cobb-Douglas specification was supported by estimation of a constant elasticity of substitution 
production function using nonlinear least squares, including plot area (H), labor use (L) and oxen use (K) as inputs:  
Output = (a1 H
ρ + a2 L
ρ + a3 K
ρ)
-v/ρ.  Estimation results were a1 = 84.7 (s.e.=1598), a2 = 5 e-07 (598 e-07), a3 = 
0.00015 (0.00910), ρ = 0.119 (0.618), v = 0.943 (0.061).  Constant returns to scale and unitary elasticity of 




Table 6–Determinants of Input and Output per Hectare– Instrumental Variables Regressions  
 
Without Household Fixed Effects
c  With Household Fixed Effects
d   
Explanatory Variables










Cropland importer  0.182*  0.006  -0.003       
Cropland exporter  0.135  -0.030  -0.076       
Fixed rent plot
b  0.029 0.163  0.029 0.006  -0.110  -0.059 
Sharecropped plot
b  -1.538*** -0.985*** -0.341** -0.008  -0.034  -0.119 
Borrowed/gift plot
b  -0.797*** -0.627*** -0.170 -0.234  -0.879*** -0.393 
Importer x fixed rent interaction
b  -0.285 -0.294  0.046       
Importer x sharecropped interaction
b  1.238*** 0.817*** 0.313      
Importer x borrowed/gift interaction
b  0.578** 0.360* -0.068       
Village (cf. Abichiu) 
- Bilalo   
- Ketar  Genet 













    
ln(Crop land owned) (ha)  0.013  -0.007  -0.033       
Landless (dummy variable=1 when cropland 
owned=0) 
0.055 0.156  0.096       
ln(Household labor supply) (number of workers)  0.188**  0.103*  0.119       
ln(Value of oxen owned) (EB)  0.0569  0.0113  0.128*       
No oxen (dummy variable=1 when oxen owned=0)  0.480  0.115  0.865*       
ln(Value of other livestock owned) (EB)  -0.0291  -0.0090  -0.0225       
No other livestock (dummy variable=1 when other 
livestock owned=0) 
0.008 -0.017  -0.095       
ln(Age of household head) (years)  -0.423***  0.154 -0.162       
Education of household head (cf. illiterate) 
-  Read and write 
-  Finished primary school 

















Without Household Fixed Effects
c  With Household Fixed Effects
d   
Explanatory Variables










Length of time in village (cf. father born in village) 
-  Father immigrated to village, farmer born 
in village 
















Ethnicity of household Oromo  0.002  -0.031  -0.083       
Number of years farmer has farmed the plot  -0.0095  -0.046  0.058  0.229  -0.021  0.016 
Red soil on field  -0.007  0.064  0.069  0.300  0.280  0.030 
Flat or gently sloping field  0.022  -0.012  -0.093  -0.144  -0.049  -0.028 
Erosion problem on field  -0.039  -0.026  -0.003  0.014  0.0005  -0.047 
Irrigated field  -0.106  -0.095  -0.136**  -0.306*  -0.082  -0.163 
Distance from field to compound (km.)  -0.0476**  0.0133  -0.0149  -0.061  -0.001  -0.043 
R
2  0.202 0.353  0.357 0.416  0.549  0.453 
a.  *, **, ***  indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  Coefficients and standard errors were corrected for sample 
weights, stratification and clustering.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.  Intercepts are not reported.    
b.  Instrumental variables used for tenure categories and interactions include predicted probabilities of each land lease type, predicted by a multinomial 
logit model including household fixed effects, and interactions between predicted probabilities of land lease types and cropland importer dummy. 
c.  Number of observations = 300. 





To interpret these coefficients, we need to consider the sums of coefficients to test the 
specific hypotheses discussed above.  In the hypothesis tests based on the no-fixed effects 
regressions, we find that labor use is more than 30% lower on importers’ sharecropped plots than 
on their owner-operated plots, and that this difference is statistically significant at the 5% level 
(Table 7).  However, we find no statistically significant differences in oxen use or yield on 
importers’ sharecropped vs. owner-operated plots, and the estimated yield difference is only 3%.  
Furthermore, in the fixed-effects regressions, there are no statistically significant differences in 
input use or yields between importers’ sharecropped and owner-operated plots, and the 
magnitude of the differences are relatively small.  The results thus provide little support for the 




Table 7 – Hypothesis Tests about Impacts of Land Tenure Variables 
Without Household Fixed Effects  With Household Fixed Effects   
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We also find no statistically significant difference between input use and yields on 
importers’ cash rented plots and their owner-operated plots, and that the predicted differences are 
relatively small (especially in the fixed-effects regressions).  This is consistent with the 
assumption that the transactions costs of monitoring fixed rental contracts are low, leading to 
relatively efficient use of rented plots as well. 
We find that estimated input use and yields are substantially lower on importers’ 
gift/borrowed plots than on their owner-operated plots, though the difference is statistically 
significant only for oxen use.  Perhaps this is because operators of gift/borrowed plots own fewer 
oxen on average than owner-operators.  Such differences also could be due to unobserved 
differences in land quality between rented or borrowed in plots and farmers’ own plots.  As 
noted in section 2, there are some differences in observed quality measures on owned vs. 
imported plots.  Most of these differences are relatively small, however, and they do not provide 
a clear pattern in terms of which types of land are of higher quality.  Thus, the available evidence 
does not provide strong cause to be concerned about this as a general problem (though we 
discuss further indirect evidence below suggesting that borrowed plots are lower in unobserved 
quality). 
We do not find statistically significant differences in output value per hectare on 
importers’ sharecropped in or rented in plots and exporters’ owner-operated plots, as predicted 
by the transaction costs theory.  The estimated differences are in the right direction (higher for 
importers’ rented or sharecropped plots than exporters owner-operated plots) but are relatively 
small in magnitude, particularly for sharecropping (yields about 5% higher on importers’ 




to that predicted by the theory (though not statistically significant).  We thus find little support 
for the transaction costs theory from the input and output regressions, consistent with the 
findings from the CLAD regression for area operated.  The results are more consistent with the 
“New School” model of efficient land lease markets. 
Several household-level factors significantly affect input use and output per hectare, 
indicating that other factor market imperfections may be important.  Labor use per hectare is 
greater for households having a larger labor endowment, and less where the head of household is 
older.  Oxen ownership has a positive impact on output value (significant at the 10% level) 
(Table 6).  More educated household heads apply less labor (10% level).  We also find a positive 
effect of household labor supply on oxen use (10% level), supporting the hypothesis that capital 
and labor are complementary.  Household level fixed effects are highly jointly significant (at the 
p=0.01 % level) in all regressions.  These household level effects suggest that factor markets do 
not function perfectly to equalize factor ratios and yields, and that imperfections in labor and/or 
oxen markets are responsible.  Other market imperfections could be responsible for such effects, 
however (Udry 1996). 
One interesting result is that households that have not been long established in the village 
(i.e., households in which the father immigrated to the village, compared to households in which 
the father was born in the village) use less oxen input per hectare and achieve lower yields.  This 
suggests that farmers’ options for leasing or borrowing oxen depend upon social relationships as 
developed through long presence in the community.   
Few of the plot quality variables had a statistically significant impact on input use or 
yields in the regressions.  This may be because the land in the study villages is generally of good 




villages.  Labor use is lower on plots that are more distant from the household compound 
(though the effect is statistically significant only in the regression without household fixed 
effects), indicating the importance of transportation costs in affecting the intensity of production.  
Surprisingly, the value of output is lower on irrigated plots, though this effect is not statistically 
significant in the fixed effects regression.  Perhaps unobservable differences between owners of 
irrigated plots and owners of non-irrigated plots account for the difference in the regression 
without fixed effects. 
The results support the hypothesis of labor or capital market imperfections leading to 
differences in factor intensities and output per hectare across households.  Before accepting this 
hypothesis, however, it is well to consider alternative explanations for these results.  It is possible 
that some omitted variable bias contributes to these effects.  For example, unobservable plot 
quality characteristics may be correlated with household endowments, leading to spurious 
conclusions.  It is difficult to be completely certain that such a bias is not present without panel 
data; however, we do control for several observable plot quality characteristics and find little 
impact of most of these variables, as noted above.  Furthermore, there is little correlation 
between observable plot quality characteristics and household endowments; e.g., the R
2 in 
regressions of labor and oxen endowments on plot quality is less that 0.05 in both cases.  Thus 
we do not have evidence to suggest that unobservable plot quality characteristics are likely to be 
strongly correlated with household factor endowments. 
Regression diagnostics indicated the presence of non-normal errors and 
heteroskedasticity in most of the regressions, although these problems were reduced by the use 
of the log-log specification.  The estimates are asymptotically normal, the sample size is 




not lead to incorrect inferences.  Nevertheless, the efficiency of the estimators may be affected 
by the use of instrumental variables and problems of multicollinearity.  Very similar results were 
found when ordinary least squares rather than instrumental variables estimation was used 
(ignoring the endogeneity of land contract choice), indicating that the use of instrumental 
variables did not greatly reduce efficiency.
22  Similar results were also found using a linear rather 
than a logarithmic specification.  Multicollinearity is a problem mainly for the oxen endowment 
variables (the correlation between ln (oxen owned) and the no oxen dummy is -0.98) and for 
some of the tenure variables (variance inflation factors greater than 10 for several of these).  
Dropping the ln (oxen owned) variable from the regressions has little impact on the regression 
results, except that the no oxen dummy no longer has a significant impact on output.  Thus 
multicollinearity between the oxen endowment variables does not cause major problems for the 
other regression results.  The multicollinearity among the tenure variables is unavoidable, since 
all of these must be included for the hypothesis tests.  In any case, we find statistically significant 
impacts of these variables despite the multicollinearity. 
These results provide little evidence to support the Marshallian view of the inefficiency 
of sharecropping.  This may partly be due to the fact that landlords share some inputs in 
production, which can help to reduce or offset the incentive effects.  However, landlords share 
very little of the inputs of pre-harvest labor or oxen, so one would still expect less of these inputs 
to be applied on sharecropped fields, if the Marshallian assumption of no monitoring and 
enforcement of labor effort were correct.  Some form of monitoring and enforcement appears to 
take place with sharecropping contracts in these Ethiopian villages. 
                                                 




Finally, we estimate the structural model of output value using three-stage least squares 
(Table 8).  We find that oxen use has a strong impact on output value, but that labor input and 
most other factors have a statistically insignificant impact.  The land tenure variables are jointly 
statistically insignificant, implying that land tenure does not have a direct measurable impact on 
total factor productivity.   We do find that productivity is lower on gift/borrowed plots than on 
importers’ own plots, controlling for input use.  This finding suggests (as do some of the earlier 
findings) that gift/borrowed plots are of lower unobserved quality.  Other factors associated with 
differences in productivity include village level effects and education (output value 15% higher 
for household heads who finished secondary school than for illiterate household heads).   Thus, 
although higher education was found to be associated with lower intensity of labor use, it is also 





Table 8 – Structural Model of Output Value (Three-Stage Least Squares Regression) 
Explanatory Variables
a  ln(output value/ha) 
ln(labor use/ha)
b  -0.085 
ln(oxen use/ha)
b  0.394*** 
Cropland importer  -0.007 
Cropland exporter  -0.015 
Fixed rent plot
b  -0.091 
Sharecropped plot
b  -0.181 
Borrowed/gift plot
b  -0.182 
Importer x fixed rent interaction
b  0.125 
Importer x sharecropped interaction
b  0.130 
Importer x borrowed/gift interaction
b  0.015 
Village (cf. Abichiu) 
- Bilalo   
- Ketar  Genet 





ln(Age of household head) (years)  -.026 
Education of household head (cf. illiterate) 
-  Read and write 
-  Finished primary school 





Red soil on field  0.076 
Flat or gently sloping field  -0.069 
Erosion problem on field  0.039 
Irrigated field  -0.093 
Distance from field to compound (km.)  -0.027 
Intercept 5.752*** 
R
2  0.476 
Hypothesis Tests 
All land tenure x land trade effects = 0  (p = 0.396) 
Importer rented plot – importer own plot = 0  0.034 (0.662) 
Importer sharecropped plot – importer own plot = 0  -0.051 (0.586) 
Importer gift/borrowed plot – importer own plot = 0    -0.167** (0.041) 
Importer rented plot – exporter own plot = 0   0.042 (0.683) 
Importer sharecropped plot – exporter own plot = 0  -0.043 (0.707) 
Importer gift/borrowed plot – exporter own plot = 0  -0.159 (0.141) 
a.  *, **, ***  indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
b.  Variables used to predict ln(labor use/ha) and ln(oxen use/ha) include the same explanatory variables used in the 




5.  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Our empirical findings are inconsistent with both the “Marshallian” perspective and the 
transaction costs theory presented in this paper.  We do not find empirical support for the 
Marshallian prediction of inefficient sharecropping, since factor intensity and output value are 
not significantly different on tenants’ own vs. sharecropped fields.  Nor do we find that factor 
intensity or output value differs significantly between cropland importers and exporters, or that 
cropland area operated is a function of area owned, as predicted by the transaction costs theory.   
Consistent with the “New School” perspective, our results indicate that land lease markets were 
operating relatively efficiently in the villages studied when the survey was conducted in 1993/94.   
As argued by Otsuka, et al. (1992), it is likely that in the absence of institutional 
restrictions on contract choice, the selection of tenancy contracts will tend to minimize 
inefficiency.  Thus, landlords who do not know prospective tenants well or for whom monitoring 
the tenant may be costly will tend to prefer a cash rental contract to a sharecropping contract.   
Where sharecropping is preferred, transaction costs are lower and hence the inefficiency is 
limited.  Furthermore, landlords who do participate in sharecropping contracts reduce the 
incentive problems by sharing some of the costs.   
Although we find that land lease markets function relatively efficiently in the study 
villages, our data were collected prior to adoption of restrictions on land leasing by the Oromia 
Regional Government in 1995.  These restrictions allow farmers to lease out no more than half of 
their land for a maximum of three years.  Such restrictions may well have reduced the efficiency 
of lease markets in the region.  Investigation of the impacts of these restrictions would be useful. 
We do find evidence supporting the hypothesis of imperfect labor or oxen lease markets.  




efficiency than efforts focused on improving land lease markets.  Promoting development of 
competitive tractor hire services, for example, might help to address the constraint that oxen 
endowment appears to pose for efficiency, while reducing grazing pressure on pastures and 
croplands. 
Another implication of our empirical results is that village level factors are important 
determinants of input use and productivity.  It may be that differences in productivity across the 
study villages resulted from local variations in rainfall or other idiosyncratic factors in 1993/94, 
so too much should not be made of this result.  However, if such village level differences persist 
over time, they suggest that factor markets do not function efficiently to equalize marginal 
returns to productive factors across villages.  For example, the absence of a land sales market in 
Ethiopia may have a more important bearing upon the ability of people to migrate to villages 
where the returns to their labor and capital are higher, than upon the efficiency of factor 
allocation within any given village.  More research on this issue at a broader scale, enabling 
identification of which village-level factors are causing differences in input use and productivity, 




Appendix 1--Derivation of First Order Conditions: 
The tenant’s optimization constraints (4) and 5)) are satisfied if the landlord solves the 
less-constrained maximization problem excluding these two equations, and taking L
t and M
t as 
choice variables.  We can therefore solve this less-constrained problem, since the solution will be 
the same. 
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Differentiating V with respect to L
t and M
t we obtain: 
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Equations A2) and A3) simplify to equations 4) and 5) since the tenant’s participation constraint 
is binding (λ > 0).   
Differentiating with respect to β  yields: 
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Substituting A5) into A6) and simplifying, we obtain equation 12). 
Differentiating with respect to L
l and M
l yields: 
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Equation A7) and A8) can be rewritten as equations 11) and 10). 
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Case 1.  Constant absolute risk aversion 
In this case, u
t
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A15) implies that 
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since E(θ ) = 1. 
Jensen’s inequality implies that  
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Using relations A16) and A17) in equation A13), we find that  















Case 2.  Increasing absolute risk aversion 
With increasing absolute risk aversion, u
t
QQQ < 0.  Therefore 













This implies that 
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Using relations A21) and A16) (which holds also with increasing absolute risk aversion) in 
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